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Financial and Housing Wealth, Expenditures and the Dividend to Ownership  
 
 
Abstract 
 
For a household, home ownership provides necessary shelter, potential investment returns associated with 
property appreciation and a hedge against increased housing related cash outlays. In addition to potential 
appreciation, individual households benefit over time from a housing dividend defined as the difference 
between the market rent for the individual household’s housing unit and the household’s actual house 
ownership costs. The purchase of a house can substantially fix a household’s recurring housing related 
expenditures and generates a hedge (implied housing dividend) that increases with ownership tenure. This 
expenditure hedge (dividend) to home ownership is documented using pooled, cross-year samples from 
the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). The housing dividend delivers a non-trivial effect on 
household non-housing expenditures after controlling for housing value, housing equity, financial assets 
and income.   
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Financial and Housing Wealth, Expenditures and the Dividend to Ownership  
  
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Understanding how home ownership and financial wealth impact household level expenditures 
and decision-making is essential. In the U.S., slightly less than two-thirds of households own the 
home in which they live and housing wealth constitutes a substantial portion of total household 
wealth (Poterba et al., 2011, and others). In fact, influential works document a housing wealth 
effect on consumption greater than the more broadly discussed stock-based equity wealth effect.1 
The housing wealth effect has been shown using macro-level aggregate data (Case et al., 2005) 
and using micro-level (household-level) data (Bostic et al., 2009).2 Notwithstanding this existing 
literature, however, much remains to be explored regarding the relations between housing, 
macro-level consumption, household level non-housing expenditures and decision-making.3 
                                                          
1 We do not want to get caught up in semantics. There is a difference between consumption and expenditures, 
especially at the household level and for durable goods and durable services. Consumption is a theoretical concept in 
economic models dated at least as early as in Friedman (1957), and expenditure is an empirical measure that is used 
to approximate consumption. At the macro-level the distinction may be less relevant given the specific question of 
interest. It is acknowledged that some consumption items may be purchased once upfront, but their produced utility 
streams will be spread over time. The literature of consumption studies using micro household data usually 
concentrates on expenditures on food or non-durable goods and non-durable services (see the superb summary and 
references listed in Deaton (1992), and more recently, Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), Malloy, et al. (2009), Aguiar and 
Hurst (2013), Aguila, et al. (2011), Attanasio, et al. (2012), Blundell, et al. (2012), among others). In these 
expenditure categories, consumption and expenditures are less likely to diverge drastically from each other. 
Whenever possible, we use “consumption” in a theoretical discussion setting, and “expenditure” in an empirically 
oriented context. We also highlight that at the household level we are modeling expenditures, or where the 
household obtains and spends its resources or cash flows. 
2 A large body of literature compares the housing wealth effect with the stock wealth effect. Beside what is cited 
elsewhere in this paper, a non-exhaustive list includes Benjamin et al. (2004), Slacalek (2009) and Carroll et al. 
(2011), among others. 
3 Engelhardt (1996) and Skinner (1996) show that the consumption response to housing capital gains, especially 
positive ones, is rather small. A homeowner can benefit from rising housing wealth by pledging the house as 
collateral to borrow to fund consumption. By doing this, the consumer retains or increases access to cash and liquid 
assets that can be used to pay for expenditures. Cooper (2013) shows that this borrowing channel is significant, 
particularly for those households who might be liquidity constrained. Gan (2010) provides similar evidence for 
Hong Kong. 
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The central issues in the present study are household level expenditures and decision-
making conditional on home ownership. Extending Sinai and Souleles (2005) who argue that 
ownership provides rent hedging, a new and relevant measure for households, the housing 
dividend (or hedge reflective of potential benefits to fixing housing services expenditures) is 
assessed while controlling for other measures of housing wealth common to the literature, 
including house value or equity. The principal interest is the relation between this dividend (or 
hedge benefit) and household expenditures. The housing dividend is defined as the difference 
between equivalent market rent for a household’s housing unit and the household’s actual 
recurring house ownership costs (expenditures such as debt service, property taxes, maintenance 
costs, et cetera). The definition of housing dividend is rooted in the user cost (or imputed rent) 
concept that occupies a central place in the housing economics literature (Poterba, 1984; 
Himmelberg et al., 2005 and others) and provides empirical recognition that the benefit to home 
ownership at the household level is related to fixing actual cash outlays for shelter in addition to 
purely an appreciation return and associated potential increased borrowing capacity. We obtain 
the formula of housing dividend by recasting the components of user cost into an explicit, simple 
form that resembles the common asset pricing framework from Miller and Modigliani (1961) 
and Flood and Hodrick (1990).4 
Housing is an asset that is either bought and owned or rented for use and occupancy. An 
individual or household makes a choice to live somewhere and determines how to pay for that 
choice. The formulization of a housing dividend explicitly recognizes an additional way 
households may benefit from home ownership. Acquisition of an owner-occupied housing unit, 
even with debt, hedges payment of the future equivalent market rent (which reflects the then 
                                                          
4 Research of testing for housing market efficiency makes progress without particular needs for a clarified definition 
of the housing dividend. Cho (1996) surveys related empirical studies.  
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current market price for occupancy), while allowing for asset appreciation. When market 
equivalent rents rise, while ownership related costs remain the same or increase less 
proportionately to market rents, homeowners benefit. That is, a homeowner is not forced to 
increase expenditures to acquire the equivalent amount of housing services because he/she has 
substantially hedged current and future expenditures through ownership. The household can 
reallocate money that would have gone to paying more for housing services if these services 
were unhedged. The benefit comes from not having to spend more over time for the same quality 
of housing in contrast to a renter’s situation in a market of rising rents. This is the economic and 
practical mechanism behind the operation of the housing dividend. 
The housing dividend benefit is further distinguished from the benefit of borrowing 
capacity by using the house as collateral (Cooper, 2013). The household retains the right to 
borrow additional funds greater than the existing debt as equity increases over time. The benefit 
to borrowing (a cash-out refinancing or home equity line or loan) is a change in cash available 
for expenditure on non-housing goods, but additional borrowing can also reduce the future 
housing dividend benefit since a new and higher level of housing ownership expenses (primarily 
debt service) may be required. Although more borrowing reduces housing dividends in the 
current and future periods, it allows households to obtain liquidity needed for expenditures.  
Since the focus is the relation between housing and consumption, detailed U.S. household 
data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) for homeowners across years is used in the 
analysis. The CEX provides detailed information on housing and non-housing household 
expenditures, along with measures of household wealth, which enables analysis connecting 
housing dividends with non-housing expenditures while controlling for wealth.5  Hence, our 
                                                          
5 In contrast, Gan (2010) uses credit card spending to measure consumption, which presumably includes spending on 
a subset of both nondurable and durable goods and services, but excludes all others where a credit card is not used. 
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baseline approach starts with regressions of homeowners’ non-housing expenditures on housing 
dividends while controlling for financial and housing wealth. The housing dividend variable is 
positive and significant, both statistically and economically, in predicting a household’s non-
housing expenditures. This is so even when house value is decomposed into home equity and 
mortgage balance. The results are robust across various specifications and suggest that housing 
ownership and the ability to hedge housing expenditures over the long-term allows households to 
increase non-housing expenditures. The choice to own allows for greater expenditures on non-
housing goods over the long-term while allowing households to also hold an asset with 
appreciation or return potential.  
The results also have implications for the buy-versus-rent literature which requires 
assumptions related to the use of any net cash flow differences with regime (rent or buy) 
switching.6 These assumptions typically assume that households exclusively allocate cash flow 
“savings” from correctly renting or buying to financial assets which then earn a market return. 
Our results show that households may tap these cash flow savings for consumption.  Finally, 
further decomposition of the data by time period suggests that the housing dividend effect 
declined during the housing boom period when housing assets were seemingly more liquid and 
debt was available for cash out refinancings. During the boom period, households concurrently 
faced a reduced housing dividend as the over-priced assets acquired during the period limited 
any hedging benefit as the cost of ownership increased substantially.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 positions the paper in relation to various strands 
of the literature. Section 3 derives the conceptual framework from the definition of user cost. 
Section 4 provides the empirical specifications for our estimation based upon that conceptual 
                                                          
6 Beracha & Johnson (2012) provide an example of the constructs related to the buy versus rent literature which 
includes debt assumptions, cash flows assumptions and housing quality assumptions across rental and owner based 
markets. 
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framework. Section 5 clarifies the CEX sample selection criteria and addresses measurement 
issues related to several key variables. Sections 6, 7 and 8 present and discuss the estimation 
results. Section 9 concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature  
The research is related to several strands of the economics and finance literatures. First, 
the study extends the growing literature devoted to understanding the relationship between 
housing wealth and non-housing consumption. The relations between housing related wealth and 
non-housing consumption have long been a focus of interest to economists and policy makers. 
The literature often focuses on static measures of housing and financial wealth without 
expliciting addressing flows, potential income returns or the ability to hedge expenditures. The 
goal has been to determine how levels (or changes in the levels) of asset values impact 
expenditures throughout the economy. For example, at the aggregate market level, Case, et al. 
(2005), using international country-level plus U.S. state-level data, estimate that the elasticity of 
consumption to housing market wealth is between 0.04 and 0.16.7  
Among research using U.S. household-level data, Engelhardt (1996) estimates that the 
Marginal Propensity to Consume (henceforth MPC) out of real housing capital gains is 0.03 (3 
cents for every dollar increase in housing wealth) for the median household. By matching a CEX 
sample with Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) data, Bostic et al. (2009) obtain estimates of 
the elasticity of consumption to home value of 0.04 to 0.06, and estimates of the elasticity of 
consumption to home equity of 0.02 to 0.04. Guo and Hardin (2014) examine a Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID) sample and obtain the same magnitude of estimates for the elasticity 
                                                          
7 Case, et al. (2011) update their previous analysis by extending the sample to more recent years, and find that new 
results only reinforce their previous conclusions.  
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of consumption to home equity as in Bostic et al. (2009). They note this estimate varies among 
households depending on wealth composition. Households with different levels of net worth in 
financial and real estate assets show different expenditure patterns. Cooper (2013) employs a 
very different set of regression specifications and estimates the MPC out of housing wealth at 
0.06, with a MPC out of home equity of  0.02 to 0.06.8 None of the noted studies explicitly 
recognizes the benefit to ownership when the actual cash expenditures for housing are 
substantially fixed or hedged. Complementing and extending existing research, this paper 
investigates this additional homeowner benefit. 
The second link and extension of existing literature is related with user cost. The 
definition of housing dividend is closely tied with the concept of user cost, one of the 
fundamental building blocks in the housing economics literature (Poterba, 1984; Himmelberg et 
al., 2005). We demonstrate in a straightforward manner that the equilibrium condition involving 
user cost can be written as a dividend discount model (DDM) with housing dividend and 
discount rate appropriately defined. While much of the application of user cost has been devoted 
to quantifying the effect of preferential tax treatments to homeowners (Poterba and Sinai, 2008), 
housing tenure choice determinants (Green, 1996; Green and White, 1997), and house price-rent 
dynamics (Duca, et al., 2011), we focus on the consumption benefits of the housing dividend. 
Household recognition of flow attributes inherent in the owner cost equation impacts 
expenditures. 
In equilibrium, user costs should equal rents for dwelling units. In a series of papers, 
however, Verbrugge and Garner (Verbrugge, 2008; Garner and Verbrugge, 2009a, 2009b) 
                                                          
8 These studies also estimate elasticities of consumption to income and to financial wealth by including them as 
additional regressors. Results vary. The elasticity estimates of income are around 0.10 to 0.30.  The elasticity 
estimates of financial wealth are in the range of 0.01 to 0.10. Except Cooper (2013), all of the cited studies above 
find a larger housing wealth elasticity than the financial wealth elasticity. 
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demonstrate that the estimated user costs and rents diverge persistently from each other to a 
surprising degree. The findings are robust regardless of using aggregate indexes or CEX unit-
level data. We note that part of this gap between the rent and the user cost is related to what we 
define as the housing dividend.  
The third (somewhat more loosely) related literature strand includes studies on 
investors’/consumers’ differentiation between dividends and capital gains. One of the primary 
theoretical foundations of financial economics is the irrelevance of dividend policy as applied to 
firm value (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). Under perfect and complete market conditions, the 
way a firm chooses to distribute returns related to earning power should not matter in its 
valuation. 9  When the distribution of dividends conflicts with consumption needs, 
investors/consumers can always reinvest disbursed dividends or sell shares to create dividend 
equivalents, thus insulating individual consumption from variations in corporate dividend 
disbursement. Recent empirical studies testing this theorem with micro level data of stock 
holdings, however, resoundingly reject the dividend irrelevance tenet (Baker et al., 2007; Dong 
et al., 2005; Graham and Kumar, 2006), although there are lively debates on why the tests fail.10 
By proposing and clarifying the housing dividend construct related to housing wealth, we open 
the possibility of subjecting housing wealth to the same category of tests with implications 
attached to the distinctive features of housing wealth.   
 
                                                          
9 Relaxing assumptions in Miller and Modigliani (1961) would challenge the Miller-Modigliani irrelevance theorem. 
Latest developments along this vein in the field of corporate finance include DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006), and 
Mori (2010). 
10  Finding different consumption propensities for dividends versus capital gains is potentially justified by the 
duration dependent net return structure generated by capital gains taxation (Balcer and Judd, 1987; Dammon et al., 
2001). Mental accounting is another behavioral finance explanation for investors’ preference for cash dividends 
(Shefrin and Statman, 1984). Meanwhile, it is well-known that equity dividend incomes are concentrated in high-
income households. These households’ consumption behavior likely differs from the average household, and, in 
particular, may be less sensitive to cash flow considerations (Poterba and Slemrod, 2007). Hence, it is difficult to 
extrapolate the Baker et al.’s (2007) estimated propensity to consume to the general population. 
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3. Theoretical Framework  
 In this section we give a precise definition of the housing dividend and expose its role in 
the pricing of house assets through an analogous formula of the dividend discount model (DDM). 
We show that insofar as a current occupant-homeowner can fix the operating cost of residing in 
the house compared with later comers, the resulting housing dividend flow shall be greater than 
that of a new buyer in the market. This housing dividend accruing to the homeowner shall 
increase over time, provided that the difference between market equivalent rent and ownership 
operating cost increases over time.  
Since a housing dividend is an implicit cash flow to current homeowners, its liquidity is 
superior to home equity since access to the latter often involves non-trivial transaction costs. We 
derive the testable hypothesis concerning the relationship between housing dividend and 
household expenditure: homeowners’ consumption expenditures respond more to housing 
dividend than to home equity. Two particular extensions of this hypothesis are: (1) when the 
liquidity of home equity increases (decreases) due to favorable (unfavorable) market conditions, 
the relative response of consumption to housing dividend versus to home equity is decreased 
(increased) accordingly; (2) insofar as the size of housing dividend rises with ownership tenure, 
the consumption response to housing dividend also increases with ownership tenure. 
We highlight a remark from Himmelberg et al. (2005, pp.68): “The ‘dividend’ portion of 
the return from owning a house comes from the rent the owner saves by living in the house rent-
free …” This insight is correct in that the “dividend” indeed includes the rent saved, hence its 
nature of implicit cash savings. But, this remark does not adjust for the realistic senario that 
homeowners may have to pay mortgages and maintenance costs, two cash outflow items that 
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renters do not have to endure. From a household expenditure or cash flow stand point, ownership 
alone does not signal the actual benefit over renting. 
 We start with the familiar (long-run) equilibrium condition in the housing market that 
annual cost of owning a particular house should equal the annual cost of renting it, which renders 
a potential buyer indifferent to owning versus renting: 
Annual cost of ownership𝑡 = Rent𝑡.       (1) 
The majority of households in the U.S. purchase their primary residence with a mortgage. 
Therefore, the exact formula to compute the annual cost of ownership (e.g., see Himmelberg et al. 
(2005)) in the left-hand side of (1) shall be modified to include the terms related to mortgage 
debt 
 
Annual cost of ownership𝑡 ≡ (1 − 𝛼𝑡)𝑃𝑡(𝑟𝑡
𝑓 + 𝛾𝑡) + 𝑃𝑡(ι𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝑟𝑡
𝑚,𝑝 +
𝛼𝑡𝑟𝑡
𝑚,𝑖) − 𝜏𝑡𝑃𝑡(𝜄𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝑟𝑡
𝑚,𝑖) + 𝑃𝑡𝛿𝑡 − (𝐸𝑡(𝑃𝑡+1) − 𝑃𝑡) , 
(2) 
where 𝑃𝑡 is the house price at time t, 𝛼𝑡 the loan-to-value ratio, 𝑟𝑡
𝑓
the risk-free interest rate, 𝛾𝑡 
the risk premium to compensate for the higher risk of owning versus renting, 𝜄𝑡 the property tax 
rate, 𝜏𝑡 the effective income tax rate, 𝑟𝑡
𝑚,𝑝
the amortized mortgage principal deduction rate, and 
𝑟𝑡
𝑚,𝑖
is the mortgage interest rate. The third term in (2) captures the tax exemption benefit of 
mortgage interest and property tax. 𝛿𝑡 is the fraction of maintenance cost relative to home value. 
The last term is the expected capital gain. 
 User cost, a central concept in the literature of housing economics, is the annual cost of 
ownership expressed as a fraction of the house value, 
User cost𝑡 ≡ Annual cost of ownership𝑡/𝑃𝑡 
=(1 − 𝛼𝑡)(𝑟𝑡
𝑓 + 𝛾𝑡) + (1 − 𝜏𝑡)(𝑙𝑡 + 𝛼𝑡𝑟𝑡
𝑚,𝑖) + 𝛼𝑡𝑟𝑡
𝑚,𝑝 + 𝛿𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡𝑔𝑡+1, 
(3) 
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where 𝐸𝑡𝑔𝑡+1 is the expected growth rate of house value. Note that (3) is a definitional equation 
paraphrased from the definitional equation (2). Hence, the equilibrium condition (1) can be 
rewritten into 
User cost𝑡 × 𝑃𝑡 = Rent𝑡 . 
 Back to the equilibrium equation (1), its simplicity obscures one critical aspect of 
homeownership: once a house is purchased, the value of some components in the annual cost of 
ownership will be more fixed than others for the foreseeable future. More specifically, when a 
homeowner enters into a mortgage contract, the periodic mortgage payment will be largely 
determined, especially for a fixed rate mortgage; the maintenance cost for the specific house 
structure shall not fluctuate in response to its market price or rent; the property tax is levied 
based upon the assessed value, which will be less volatile than the market price; and, various tax 
exemptions will add to the relative stability of the tax bill. 
 To capture this in the model, suppose at time t=0, a buyer purchased a house when the 
cost of ownership was less than the rent, that is, 
 
(1 − 𝛼0)𝑃0(𝑟0
𝑓 + 𝛾0) − (𝐸0(𝑃1) − 𝑃0) + 𝑃0(𝑙0 + 𝛼0𝑟0
𝑚,𝑝 + 𝛼0𝑟0
𝑚,𝑖) −
𝜏0𝑃0(𝑙0 + 𝛼0𝑟0
𝑚,𝑖) + 𝑃0𝛿0 < Rent0 . 
(4) 
   
Take the last three terms in the left-hand side of (4) (mortgage payment and property tax, tax 
exemption savings, and maintenance cost) and name them as the operating cost of ownership, or 
OC for short: 
 OC0 ≡ 𝑃0(𝑙0 + 𝛼0𝑟0
𝑚,𝑝 + 𝛼0𝑟0
𝑚,𝑖) − 𝜏0𝑃0(𝑙0 + 𝛼0𝑟0
𝑚,𝑖) + 𝑃0𝛿0 . (5) 
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From our preceding discussion, after purchase, OC will be fixed to this new homeowner. Yet the 
vector of the market price, rent, and risk-free rate and risk premium will continue to fluctuate 
over time (Rent𝑡, 𝑃𝑡, 𝑟𝑡
𝑓 , 𝛾𝑡)𝑡=1
∞ . 
 In the idealized setting, for this specific house, its structure and size cannot be changed, 
and there are always buyers in the market bidding on this house. Sooner or later, at some point of 
time t>0, to potential buyers, the equilibrium condition for the house will again be attained: 
 Rent𝑡 = (1 − 𝛼𝑡)𝑃𝑡(𝑟𝑡
𝑓 + 𝛾𝑡) − (𝐸𝑡(𝑃𝑡+1) − 𝑃𝑡) + OC𝑡. (6) 
Equation (6) is restructured from the equilibrium condition (1), singling out OC𝑡 for its tendency 
of being fixed. Equation (6) can be reformatted into 
 𝑃𝑡 =
Rent𝑡 − OC𝑡
1 + (1 − 𝛼𝑡)(𝑟𝑡
𝑓 + 𝛾𝑡)
+
𝐸𝑡(𝑃𝑡+1)
1 + (1 − 𝛼𝑡)(𝑟𝑡
𝑓 + 𝛾𝑡)
   , (7) 
where the perceived dividend for potential buyers is 
 DIV𝑡  ≡ Rent𝑡 − OC𝑡    , (8) 
which is the present definition of the housing dividend: the difference between market rent and 
operating cost of ownership. If we iterate (7) into future periods, it becomes a version of the 
dividend discount model, with the current price 𝑃𝑡 represented by the present value of the future 
dividend stream with the corresponding discount rate as (1 − 𝛼𝑡)(𝑟𝑡
𝑓 + 𝛾𝑡) . 
 For the homeowner who currently resides in the house, however, the operating cost is 
OC0 rather than OC𝑡. Thus, the actual housing dividend enjoyed by this occupying homeowner is 
Rent𝑡 − OC0. Let 𝑃𝑡
𝑜 denote the private value placed by the occupying homeowner, then 
 𝑃𝑡
𝑜 =
Rent𝑡 − OC0
1 + (1 − 𝛼𝑡)(𝑟𝑡
𝑓 + 𝛾𝑡)
+
𝐸𝑡(𝑃𝑡+1)
1 + (1 − 𝛼𝑡)(𝑟𝑡
𝑓 + 𝛾𝑡)
   . (9) 
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In a generally up-trending market, new buyers will face higher mortgage payments and property 
taxes than the current homeowner who has resided in the house for some time. Therefore the 
operating cost of ownership of the current homeowner will be less than that of potential buyers,  
 OC0 < OC𝑡  , (10) 
while other determinants in the market on the right-hand side of (9) will be the same for both. 
This implies, for the current homeowner, the housing dividend accruing is higher  than  what  
would accrue to a new owner: 
 DIV𝑡
𝑜 > DIV𝑡  . (11) 
where Div𝑡
𝑜 is the housing dividend enjoyed by the current homeowner who purchased the house 
at period 0. Hence, the market price of the house is below her private value placed on it:  
 𝑃𝑡 < 𝑃𝑡
𝑜 . (12) 
This suggests continued occupancy of the house and not a sell, other things held constant.   
Having established the intrinsic benefit of owning and occupying the house and enjoying 
the housing dividend flow, we demonstrate that given that the liquidity attributes of the housing 
dividend are superior to those of home equity, the consumption response to a change in housing 
dividend is accordingly higher than that to the change of home equity.  
This is best illustrated in a continuous-time stochastic setting for analytical convenience. 
We write the house pricing equation (7) in its continuous-time counterpart form in which the 
market price of the house, 𝑃𝑡, faced by the homeowner, follows the Brownian process  
 
𝑑𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡
= (𝑐 + 𝑑)𝑑𝑡 + 𝜎𝑐𝑑𝑍𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑑𝑍𝑑,𝑡 , (13) 
where 𝑐 is the expected rate of capital gain, and 𝑑 is the expected housing dividend yield. 𝜎𝑐
2 and 
𝜎𝑑
2 are the instantaneous conditional variances correspondingly. There is a (probably positive) 
correlation between housing dividends and capital gains denoted by the instantaneous covariance 
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𝜎𝑐,𝑑 . From our previous discussion, the current occupant-homeowner enjoys higher housing 
dividend flow than that expected in the market for a potential buyer. We capture this by adding a 
positive 𝜑 to d so that 𝑑 + 𝜑 is the housing dividend yield for the current homeowner. 
 Aside from housing, the homeowner can also save in a risk-free security at the constant 
rate 𝑟𝑓.
11 Net worth at the end of period 𝑡, 𝑊𝑡, is divided between home equity and savings in the 
risk-free asset, 𝑆𝑡,  
 𝑊𝑡 = 𝜃(𝑃𝑡 − 𝐿𝑡) +  𝑆𝑡, (14) 
where 𝐿𝑡 is the mortgage loan balance. Since housing dividend is a kind of cash savings, it is a 
component of 𝑆𝑡. Since cashing out home equity involves some transaction costs, 𝜃 (0 < 𝜃 < 1) 
is the liquidity discount coefficient applied to home equity.  
Let 𝜔𝑡 be the fraction of wealth held in the home equity. With consumption in period 𝑡 
denoted by 𝐶𝑡, the dynamic evolution of the homeowner’s net worth over time is 
 
𝑑𝑊𝑡 = [𝜔𝑡(𝜃𝑐 + 𝑑 + 𝜑) + (1 − 𝜔𝑡)𝑟
𝑓]𝑊𝑡𝑑𝑡 − 𝐶𝑡𝑑𝑡 − 𝜔𝑡𝑊𝑡𝑟
𝑚,𝑝𝑑𝑡
+ 𝜔𝑡𝑊𝑡(𝜃𝜎𝑐𝑑𝑍𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜎𝑑𝑑𝑍𝑑,𝑡)  . 
(15) 
 
where 𝑟𝑚,𝑝  is the amortized mortgage principal reduction rate. Furthermore, we assume the 
investor/consumer is maximizing the expected discounted future utility 
 
𝐸 ∫ 𝑒−𝜌𝑠𝑈(𝐶𝑠)𝑑𝑠 ,
𝑇
𝑠=𝑡
 
 
(16) 
                                                          
11 The essence of the model remains the same should income and more assets be allowed for, but the derivation will 
be considerably more cumbersome.  
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where 𝜌  is the discount rate, and 𝑈(. )  is the within-period utility function. The 
investor/consumer’s objective is to maximize (16) subject to (15). The maximized value of the 
function (16) is denoted by the value function 𝐽(𝑊𝑡). 
The solution to this problem can be characterized by the standard Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman 
equation 
 𝜌𝐽(𝑊) = max𝐶,𝜔[𝐷
𝑐𝐽(𝑊) + 𝑈(𝐶)]  ,  
where 
 
𝐷𝑐𝐽(𝑊) = [(𝜔(𝜃𝑐 + 𝑑 + 𝜑 − 𝑟𝑚,𝑝) + (1 − 𝜔)𝑟𝑓)𝑊 − 𝐶]𝐽𝑊(𝑊) 
+
1
2
 𝜔2𝑊2(𝜃2𝜎𝑐
2 + 𝜎𝑑
2 + 2𝜃𝜎𝑐𝑑)𝐽𝑊𝑊(𝑊), 
 
from which we solve out 
 𝜔∗ = −
(𝜃𝑐 + 𝑑 + 𝜑 − 𝑟𝑚,𝑝 − 𝑟𝑓)𝐽𝑊(𝑊)
(𝜃2𝜎𝑐2 + 𝜎𝑑
2 + 2𝜃𝜎𝑐𝑑)𝑊𝐽𝑊𝑊(𝑊)
  .  
 
In order to proceed for an explicit solution of optimal consumption, 𝐶∗, a particular form of 
utility function for 𝑈(𝐶) has to be specified. Let it be the Constant Relative Risk Aversion 
(CRRA) function, 
 𝑈(𝐶) =
𝐶1−𝛾
1 − 𝛾
 ,  
from which we solve out the optimal consumption as 
 
𝐶∗ =
𝛾 − 1
𝛾
[𝑟𝑓 +
𝜌
𝛾 − 1
+
1
2𝛾
(𝜃𝑐 + 𝑑 + 𝜑 − 𝑟𝑚,𝑝 − 𝑟𝑓)2
(𝜃2𝜎𝑐2 + 𝜎𝐷
2 + 2𝜃𝜎𝑐𝑑)
] 𝑊 ≡ 𝜅 ⋅ 𝑊
≡ 𝜅(𝜃 ⋅ HE + 𝑆) =  𝜅𝜃 ⋅ HE + 𝜅 ⋅ 𝑆 . 
(17) 
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In (17) the Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) for home equity is 𝜅𝜃, and for liquid 
savings (a portion of which comes from housing dividend) it is 𝜅. Apparently, from its algebraic 
expression, 𝜅 increases with 𝑐, 𝑑 or 𝜑, implying a higher MPC when the housing dividend or the 
capital gain is higher. But the increase in 𝜅 is larger with respect to the increase in 𝑑 or 𝜑, as the 
latter two have no liquidity discount, in contrast to the case for 𝑐 . To the extent that the 
magnitude of 𝜑 would rise for the current homeowner because of longer tenure, the MPC would 
be higher, all else equal. Finally, although it is difficult to pin down the direction of change in 𝜅 
in response to a change in 𝜃 (which depends on the sign of, say, 𝑑 + 𝜑 − 𝑟𝑚,𝑝 − 𝑟𝑓), at least, 
when 𝜃  increases — that is, when the liquidity of home equity improves — the relative 
difference between the MPC of home equity and the MPC of housing dividend will shrink. 
 
4. Empirical Framework  
Following the theoretical model outlined in the last section, a homeowner’s housing 
dividend (DIV) can be measured by the following equation, 
 
𝐷𝐼𝑉 = 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑆𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 − 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 − 𝑀𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠,        (18) 
 
where 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡 is the current market rent of the homeowner’s present house, and the other 
three variables are tax benefits, mortgage payments (including insurance expenses and property 
taxes) and house related maintenance costs, respectively. Constructed in such a way, DIV 
represents the housing dividend benefit arising from home ownership. It measures the implied 
cash flow benefit associated with ownership. 
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We start with the following specification to estimate the relationship between logs of 
expenditures (C), housing dividend (DIV), home value (H), financial wealth (𝐹𝑖𝑛), and income 
(𝐼), 
 
 
log(𝐶𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1log (DIV𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2 log(𝐻𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛽3 log(𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽4 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐼𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,   
(19) 
   
where i is the household index, and t is the year index.  𝑋𝑖,𝑡  is the vector of household-level 
demographic controls (such as age, family size, etc.),  𝑢𝑡  captures year effects, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  is the 
idiosyncratic disturbance term.12  Equation (19), without the housing dividend variable, is a fairly 
conventional specification in the literature (Bostic et al., 2009). 
The housing dividend includes measures of mortgage debt. To demonstrate that the 
housing dividend effect is not merely a manifestation of a mortgage effect, we break down home 
value into equity and mortgage debt in the second specification. Including home equity (HE) and 
mortgage balance (𝑀), 
 
 
log (𝐶𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1log (DIV𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽2 log(HE𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽3 log(𝑀𝑖,𝑡) +
𝛽4 log(𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽5 log(𝐼𝑖,𝑡) + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  .                                             
 
(20) 
Housing equity and mortgage debt are joint determinants of consumption at the household level. 
From a cash flow standpoint, the amount of mortgage debt outstanding reflects cash that has 
                                                          
12 Due to the fact that the financial wealth information is only available in the fifth interview of CUs in CEX, we 
cannot exploit the quarterly panel nature of CEX. 
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been withdrawn against the property’s value which may have allowed consumption or 
investment in financial assets at a prior point. This withdrawn cash either decreases the cash 
outlay that would otherwise occur (when the loan is used towards purchases of the property), 
increases the balance of other assets (when the cash is spent on purchases of other assets or 
investments which likely enhances liquidity) or is channeled directly towards consumption. The 
cash flow impact of mortgage loans on consumption expenditures has found empirical support in 
recent studies (Muellbauer, 2007; Benjamin and Chinloy, 2008; Guo and Hardin, 2014).  
 
5.  Sample Selection and Measurement Issues 
 
NBER’s CEX extracts are used to construct the pooled sample for the period 1988 to 
2011.13 Housing market prices and housing costs of ownership, along with mortgage balances 
outstanding, are extracted from the BLS version of the original CEX sample.14 The criteria for a 
consumer unit (CU) (most likely a household) to be selected for analysis are standard: the CU 
has to be interviewed consecutively for four quarters (the maximum number of quarters for 
which a CU could be interviewed), is a “complete income reporter” as defined by the BLS, is not 
                                                          
13 1995:Q3-Q4 and 2004:Q3-Q4 observations are omitted due to a sample frame change that occurred in 1996 and 
2005, which makes it impossible to track a small fraction of the consumer units for the full year. Observations from 
years prior to 1988 as well as 1991:Q2-Q4 and 1992 are omitted due to unavailability of detailed expenditure files 
on mortgage payments and house operational costs. 
14 NBER CEX files (cleaned and streamlined by Ed Harris and John Sabelhaus) condensed hundreds of expense 
categories into a much smaller set of summary categories (the documentation can easily be accessed at 
http://www.nber.org/data/ces_cbo.html) and annualized the data. The BLS version of the CEX samples also includes 
some summary categories that may overlap with those in the NBER extract version, but they are presented on a 
quarterly basis. Whenever possible, we use what is already available in the NBER version; if a particular variable or 
spending category is opaque, missing, or limited in construction in the NBER version, we turn to the family (FMLY) 
or detailed expenditure files of BLS version. For example, the variable of owned housing principal reduction in the 
NBER version includes the reduction of mortgage principals on vacation properties, whereas the BLS version 
distinguishes between these two. For the post-2007 data for which NBER version is unavailable, we follow Harris 
and Sabelhaus’ procedure to create those summary-level expenditure variables to be consistent. 
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a student household, and has unambiguous homeownership status.15 We only use the house-
related records pertaining to the property that the consumer unit occupies and further restrict the 
sample to households reporting positive pre-tax income and positive food expenditures. Financial 
wealth equals the combined balances in checking, savings, and brokerage accounts. All measures 
of expenditures are annualized. All economic variables, if applicable, are deflated to 2005 dollars 
using the CPI-U index.  
Summary statistics of the benchmark analysis sample are presented in Table 1. The 
typical household is headed by a 52 year-old person. 67 percent of the heads of household from 
the sample periods are married. The typical family size is 2.7 members. 89 percent of the 
households live in urban areas. 89 percent of household heads are caucasian. In the sample, the 
median value of home equity is substantially greater than the value of financial wealth, but is 
only slightly greater than the balance of mortgage debt. The financial wealth has the greatest 
variation relative to its mean. Perhaps most important, the median housing dividend, which is a 
recurring flow measure, is very similar in size to the median stock holdings of a household. In 
essence, the typical household receives a flow benefit (implied dividend) on an annual basis that 
is almost equivalent to its stock of financial assets. For example, a household may receive $3,000 
per year by accounting for its housing dividend while holding only $2,500 in stock/financial 
assets. The household would need $60,000 in financial assets yielding 5% annually to generate 
an equivalent dividend yield on its financial assets. This highlights the importance and relevance 
of housing dividends. 
Expenditure measures are of three primary types: durable goods, non-durable goods, and 
services, in accordance with the latest 2009 comprehensive revision of classifications of Personal 
                                                          
15 Which means, for instance, a homeowner who rents a property elsewhere to live in is discarded from the sample. 
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Consumption Expenditures (PCE) (McCully and Teensma, 2008).16 In the standard classification 
system, services include housing and utilities, healthcare, transportation services, recreation 
services, food services and accommodations, financial services and insurance, and other services. 
However, for our purpose, housing-related maintenance, insurance and other expenses are 
excluded from services expenditures to avoid a confounding bias due to the use of these 
expenses to generate the housing dividend (which already includes these expenditures and debt 
service as part of the recurring expenditures related to home ownership). Total consumption 
expenditures are the sum of the above three primary types. Food expenditures include food 
consumed at and outside the home in our analysis.17 These estimates related to food facilitate 
comparisons with previous studies using PSID data to examine wealth effects and food 
expenditures. We also add two broader measures of services and total expenditures that add 
education expenses and charitable giving into the components of their baseline definitions. 
The CEX data provide estimates of the market value for each household’s housing unit. 
The BLS version of the CEX is used to extract this value from the household’s initial interview. 
The value estimate is provided by the CU. Correspondingly, the mortgage principal balance is 
also the amount reported by the household. Home equity is calculated as the difference between 
these two. 
                                                          
16 In general, goods are commodities that can be stored and perhaps used over time, and services are commodities 
that cannot be stored and have to be consumed at the time and location of purchase. For an item that has both a 
goods component and a services component, the classification is based on the predominant component (e.g., 
spending on alcoholic beverages consumed away from home is classified as services). Durable goods have an 
average useful life of at least 3 years, including motor vehicles and parts, furnishings and durable household 
equipment, recreational goods and vehicles, and other durable goods. Nondurable goods have an average useful life 
of less than 3 years, including food and beverages purchased for off-premises consumption, clothing and footwear, 
gasoline and other energy goods. 
17 In the 2009 revision of the NIPA Personal Consumption Expenditures classification system, purchased meals and 
beverages at food services and drinking places are counted as services (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2012), thus 
spending at restaurants is now counted as service expenditures, in contrast to as non-durable goods as before. 
However, the food expenditure used in this paper covers both food purchased for home production as well as 
consumed at restaurants, therefore is a mix of components from non-durable goods and services categories. 
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Recall that the housing dividend for homeowners is defined as the equivalent market rent 
(what a homeowner would receive should he or she rent the house) plus tax savings related to 
interest payments and property taxes, then subtracted by the mortgage payments (inclusive of 
principal reduction, 18  mortgage interest and property taxes), house maintenance, repairs, 
insurance, and other expenses. Two data issues related to this variable are worth noting. First, the 
variables used to derive the “housing dividend” are all available in CEX, except individual 
federal tax rates, without which a homeowner’s tax savings cannot be exactly imputed. While it 
may be possible to impute household-level tax benefits related to homeownership, we, however, 
have chosen not to do so, which likely understates housing dividends. The present results would 
likely be strengthened should tax benefit estimates be incorporated.  
Second, the equivalent market rent for the house of a homeowner is self-assessed. These 
self-reported rents could be noisy relative to some benchmark, either professionally assessed 
rents or the predicted values of a hedonic regression model.19 The benchmark is difficult to 
define, however, if the owner-occupied dwelling units fundamentally differ from rental units by 
location and zoning codes restrict actions that can be taken by homeowners. In addition and more 
important in the context of CEX data, a benchmark or general index does not tie each household 
observation (concerning the household’s mortgage debt, financial assets, household expenditures, 
et cetera) directly to a property. A homeowner has both advantages and disadvantages in 
providing an estimate of equivalent rent when compared with professional assessors. On one 
hand, a homeowner has to stay alert to rental market conditions to be able to offer an accurate 
                                                          
18 This variable is to be distinguished from another variable — special or lump sum mortgage payments, which may 
or may not be related with refinancing or property transactions. As a robustness check, we exclude all observations 
that report non-zero values for lump sum mortgage payments, or non-zero values in purchase or selling prices of 
properties, and find virtually no difference in results. 
19 Francois (1989) lists a number of reasons why a hedonic model using market rents would underestimate the true 
underlying rents. 
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estimate. On the other hand, it is possible that a homeowner possesses superior information that 
is unavailable to outside assessors in estimating equivalent rent.20 Specifically, for the present 
case, Garner and Verbrugge (2009a) find that in CEX data the self-reported equivalent rents are 
sensibly related to the limited set of housing characteristics, such as home value, number of 
rooms, structural type, age of dwelling, poverty rate in the region, et cetera. This suggests 
homeowners are reasonably informed concerning the housing market when estimating market 
rents. In any case, if there is any potential classical measurement error in the self-reported 
equivalent market rent that enters into the housing dividend variable, the textbook conclusion for 
errors-in-variables holds that the coefficient estimates of household dividend are biased towards 
zero. The implication is that the reported estimates of the housing dividend variable could be in 
the low-end range of its true parameter value which strengthens the results presented.21, 22 
Likewise, some concerns with respect to the accuracy of the wealth variables (financial 
wealth in particular) in CEX data need to be addressed. For instance, Bostic et al. (2009) argue 
that the CEX financial wealth variables may be noisy and of limited scope. This is why they 
resort to a statistical matching algorithm to combine CEX with Survey of Consumer Finances 
                                                          
20 Heston and Nakamura (2009) note the possibility that homeowners might place above market values when 
assessing equivalent rents if units have special features.  
21 It is possible that the noise in equivalent rents is non-random, correlated with household characteristics or even 
expenditures in one way or the other. Explicit evidence on this, especially for the CEX self-reported rent data, is 
elusive. If the literature on the quality of homeowners’ self-assessed house value is of any guidance, no consensus 
has been attained. Goodman and Ittner (1992) and the earlier studies cited therein, and more recently, Kiel and Zabel 
(1999) and Agarwal (2007), find homeowners mostly overestimated their house value by several percentage points 
relative to an outside benchmark. Ihlanfeldt and Martinez-Vazquez (1986) find the discrepancy between 
homeowners’ self-assessed house value and appraisal value is related to owners’ race and age. Agarwal (2007) finds 
that whether a homeowner is an overestimator or an underestimator depends on a host of household socioeconomic 
characteristics. In contrast, Kain and Quigley (1972), Goodman and Ittner (1992) and Kiel and Zabel (1999) find the 
errors in these estimates are not statistically significantly related to characteristics of the owners. The discrepancy in 
the findings of studies cited above may well rest on the different data sources these authors use. Regardless, owners’ 
assessed house value is heavily employed in empirical work. In theory, how a consumer plans his or her 
consumption depends justifiably on the perception of wealth and income level he or she has given the information 
set at that point of time. Agarwal (2007) provides evidence supporting this view. 
22 In addition, the limitations of CEX data on housing characteristics variables prevent us from taking a cross-
hedonic estimation to obtain predicted equivalent rents for these households, as done in Goodman (1988). To assess 
the impact of over-estimating rents, we discount each household’s reported rent value by as large as 10% and still 
find the housing dividend effect is comparable to the home value wealth effect in terms of MPCs. 
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(SCF) samples to obtain balance sheet-related measures. This view, however, does not represent 
the consensus on the issue, as a number of studies have endorsed the validity of available CEX 
balance sheet information (Attanasio, 1994; Johnson and Li, 2009, 2010; Maki, 2001). Johnson 
and Li (2009, Table 3) show that the mean levels of primary mortgage, vehicle loans, and credit 
card balances of consumer units in the CEX are fairly close to those in the SCF, while the CEX 
displays lower variation in these variables relative to the SCF.23   
To shed light on measurement concerns, we present in the appended Table A1 the 
estimated coefficients of home value and financial wealth without controlling for the housing 
dividend. This is the baseline specifiction used in Bostic et al. (2009, Table 3). Compared with 
their results, the present estimates show a somewhat larger effect for home value (0.10 for 
durables and 0.12 for total expenditures) and for income, but a similar effect for financial wealth 
in terms of elasticity.24 This is consistent with the view that wealth variables in CEX are not 
necessarily noisier in the classical sense of errors-in-variables violations. Again, recognition is 
made with regard to the overall data associated with this and other papers related to the area of 
interest, which nonetheless is central to policy and household decision-making. 
 
6.  Life-cycle patterns 
 
Figure 1 depicts housing dividend life-cycle patterns. The sample is divided into eight 5-
year age groups based on the head of household’s age. The last group is with age equal to or 
                                                          
23 This probably reflects the top-coding of some of the variables in CEX. In Table A2, we provide the estimates 
from the median regressions, which are less likely to be affected by top-coding, to show that they are similar to 
those yielded by linear regressions. 
24 These estimates are comparable to other studies using different sources of micro data and different estimation 
schemes. For example, by exploring a large panel data set of Hong Kong households with various econometric 
specifications, Gan (2010) estimates a housing wealth effect of about 0.10-0.19 measured by the elasticity of 
consumption. 
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above 65. The mean of housing dividends (in 2005 dollars) is computed for each group from all 
years, from 1988 to 1996, from 1997 to 2006, and from 2007 to 2011, respectively. The period of 
the late 1990s to 2005 or 2006 represents the housing booming period preceding the latest 
housing market crash (Glaeser, et al., 2010; Ferreira and Gyourko, 2011). The age related 
measures are meaningful in several ways. It is likely that households headed by older members 
have longer house tenure while the life-cycle pattern should follow a typical housing choice or 
housing quality pattern. 
Figure 1 clearly demonstrates that inflation adjusted housing dividends increase across 
the age groups for all three time periods. For the entire sample, the mean real housing dividend 
increases from $860 for the 25-29 age group to over $6,700 for the 65+ age group. This trend 
suggests that the housing dividend (housing expenditure hedge) accrues more to households 
headed by older persons, likely due to the fact that many of them have resided longer in their 
current housing units. This fact is confirmed by Figure 3, showing the rise of housing dividend 
with housing tenure. Interestingly, Garner and Short (2009) also find that older households’ (age 
65 and above) implicit rental incomes (akin to our housing dividends) are greater than younger 
households’ across all deciles of income distribution, no matter what method is used for 
computing the equivalent rents of owner-occupied house units. The life-cycle profile of housing 
dividends contrasts with the hump-shaped profiles of earnings and consumption expenditures 
documented in Ghez and Becker (1975) and Gourinchas and Parker (2002).  
To better understand the rise in housing dividend with age, the dividend is broken into 
three components (equivalent rent, mortgage payments, and maintenance, insurance and other 
expenditures) to study the relative importance of each in driving the observed trend. Since the 
BLS data does not disaggregate information for mortgage and maintenance prior to 1994, and 
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there was a sample frame change for the 1995 survey, we focus on the 1996-2011 period. Figure 
2 presents the decomposition results underlying the pattern in Figure 1.  
The most striking observation from this figure is the steep decline in real mortgage 
payments (the red, solid curve) after age 35-39. The inflation adjusted rental value of the housing 
unit (the blue, dashed curve) increases slightly and peaks at age 40-44 and then gradually levels 
off. This is consistent with the life-cycle variation in family composition, which in turn leads to 
the variation in the demand for housing services over the life-cycle. The last component, 
maintenance costs (the green, dotted curve), again inflation adjusted, is stable as expected, 
slowly increasing with age until about age 60 and then leveling off. Taken together, the market 
equivalent rent contributes to a larger share in the housing dividend over time, as real rents 
increase over time and mortgage payments become a smaller component of expenditure over 
time.  
 
7.  Primary empirical results  
 
Since expenditure and wealth variables are in logarithms in the specifications, their 
associated coefficients are interpreted as elasticities. To compute the marginal propensity to 
consume (MPC) estimate, each of the estimated coefficients is multiplied by the ratio of the 
respective expenditure relative to the wealth/income variable.25 For example, to obtain the MPCs 
for food expenditure, the food elasticities from the regressions are multiplied with food 
expenditure relative to the value of each of the wealth component variables and income. Since 
                                                          
25 For aggregate data, within the representative agent framework, the coefficients from the regression of the log 
consumption on the log of wealth components may be interpreted as wealth shares, given the co-integration 
relationship between these variables arising from the budget constraint (Ludvigson, 2007). 
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the ratios differ across households, a benchmark is needed. The median of a ratio measure in the 
sample, a common benchmark statistic, is used to calculate the corresponding MPC.  
Table 2 provides initial results using home value as the housing measure for households 
with heads aged 26 to 55, the primary wage-earning age group. In these regressions, home value 
is used without decomposition into equity and debt components. The results offer initial support 
for the importance of the housing dividend, as the coefficients are statistically significant across 
expenditure categories. The MPCs also have practical significance. While the estimated 
elasticities of the housing dividend variable are smaller than all the ones for home value and 
most for financial wealth, the implied MPCs of the housing dividend are meaningful. For total 
expenditure, the estimated elasticity of the housing dividend is 0.0115 with a MPC of over 4 
cents for every dollar. This MPC rises to above 5 cents if education expenses and charitable 
giving are counted. The housing dividend MPC is greater than the home value MPC.26 The 
control variables have coefficients in line with expectations. 
In addition, Table 2 shows that the housing dividend effect differs by expenditure type. 
The housing dividend has its greatest impact on food and service expenditures. 27  For food 
expenditure, the elasticity estimate of housing dividend is 0.024, statistically significant at the 1% 
level. Its implied MPC is 0.02, virtually identical to the MPC for after-tax income and larger than 
the MPC of home value. For service expenditures, the elasticity is 0.01, again statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The implied MPC is 0.022, greater than the MPC of home value, but 
                                                          
26 The estimated elasticities for the conventional wealth components are generally similar to those in the literature 
(see the referred studies in Section 2). For example, when we look at the total expenditure, the estimates are in line 
with existing studies: the home value elasticity is 0.0962 with a MPC of 0.02, the financial wealth elasticity is 
0.0178 with a MPC of 0.09 and the log of after-tax income coefficient is 0.2484 with a MPC of 0.12. All are 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. 
27 Recall that service expenditure includes food at restaurants. See Section 4 for related discussion. 
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less than that of financial wealth or income. For both expenditures, the housing dividend is 
meaningful, both statistically and practically. 
For durable expenditure, the MPC of housing dividend is negative at -0.035 and is 
significant at the 5% level. 28 This is likely due to the fact that the housing dividend is implicit 
and is more fungible with non-durable expenditures, while durable expenditures (such as the 
purchase of a new vehicle) are usually financed through collateral based loans. This could occur 
if, say, other things equal, the growth of durable goods loans positively correlates with that of 
mortgage loans, for this would increase the purchasing power of households for the durable 
goods. Although not of key interest in our investigations, the finding certainly deserves further 
research.  
Overall, the housing dividend is closely associated with increased food and service 
expenditures as well as non-durables. The economic and statistical significance of the housing 
dividend in predicting non-housing expenditures is apparent, even after controling for home 
value, which implies that the dividend irrelevance argument (Miller & Modigliani, 1961; Baker, 
et al., 2007) is not stringently applicable to housing as an asset and that homeowners benefit 
from fixing or hedging their ownership expenses via purchase. Households can subsequently 
reallocate the underlying income to food, services and other types of expenditures, independent 
of whether households have taken on additional housing related debt or housing disposition.   
The regressions in Table 3 have home value decomposed into home equity and mortgage 
debt as separate regressors, corresponding to specification (20).29 This specification isolates the 
effect of the housing dividend from the effects of home equity and mortgage debt. With this 
                                                          
28 We also note that the goodness of fit for the regression of durable expenditure is substantially lower than other 
expenditures.  
29 In addition, to address the concerns of top-coding for wealth and income variables in the CEX (Poterba & 
Slemrod, 2007), we conduct median regressions with the same set of dependent and independent variables and 
obtain similar results, as are presented in Table A2.  
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specification, the estimated elasticities for home equity and financial wealth related to total 
expenditure from the current CEX sample are comparable to those found in Guo and Hardin 
(2014) which uses PSID data. The elasticities for mortgage debt are much smaller in comparison, 
but this smaller magnitude masks the variations evidenced during different housing market 
phases, as is shown by Table 4 and will be discussed in the next section. 
The results in Table 3 extend those in Table 2, and highlight a more meaningful role for 
the housing dividend. For total expenditure, the estimated elasticity for the housing dividend, 
0.0133, is once again statistically significant at the 1% level and is larger than its counterpart in 
Table 2 (0.0115). More important, the MPC for the housing dividend (0.05) is more than double 
the MPC for the home equity variable (0.02).  
Comparisons across expenditure types continue to exhibit heterogeneity in the impact of 
the housing dividend. The corresponding estimated coefficients and implied MPCs for the 
housing dividend are very similar to those in Table 2. More noteworthy is the fact that the MPCs 
for the housing dividend are all larger than those of home equity and mortgage debt across all 
expenditure categories except durables. The housing dividend coefficient for the durable 
expenditure again remains negative. The housing dividend MPC for the broadly defined total 
expenditures category is the greatest when compared to those for other expenditure types, is 
slightly stronger than that in Table 2, and is substantially greater than those for housing equity 
and debt.   
Overall, the results in Table 2 and Table 3 show that the housing dividend is of practical 
significance. Households benefit by the fixation of home ownership costs and the hedging of 
changes in housing service costs as reflected by inflation adjusted changes in the market value of 
rents after controlling for housing equity, financial wealth and income. Households also benefit 
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from home ownership by paying down their mortgages which provides an opportunity to 
generate cash via refinancing or sale. These two benefits are separate and on top of the 
accumulation of housing wealth as measured by house equity. Our results differentiate between 
an investment return in housing (appreciation) and an ownership gain from actually owning and 
occupying the property.  
 
8.  Empirical results segmented by real estate cycle and by housing tenure 
 
Beginning in the late 1990s, but especially during the early 2000s up until 2006, the 
United States saw a change in its residential housing markets characterized by excess price 
appreciation amid easy credit and subprime lending (Ferreira and Gyourko, 2011; Mayer, 2011). 
During the residential boom, housing morphed from a long-term consumption good with 
potential for long-term appreciation to a perceived investment option with substantial liquidity. 
In addition, subprime mortgages, low documentation loans and other aggressive lending options 
were not as widespread or accessible in the housing market until the late 1990s and early 2000s 
when the housing market expanded faster than fundamentals. 30  These changing market 
conditions and their impacts on housing dividends warrant separate examinations of the three 
periods of the sample (1988-1996, 1997-2006, and 2007-2011) when market conditions arguably 
differ. The analysis below is restricted to households in the 26-55 age group.  
Table 4 presents the results associated with the three sub-periods. The models 
substantially retain the statistical relations over the periods with regard to the food expenditure, 
service expenditure, and the broader measures of service and total expenditures (inclusive of 
                                                          
30 We provide only the description and do not investigate causal relations related to mortgage lending changes and 
price appreciation. 
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educational and charitable spending). A couple of meaningful and interesting observations, 
however, emerge from the cross-period comparison, especially when the housing market crash 
period is compared with the rest.  
First and foremost, the housing dividend effects are statistically significant and larger, in 
terms of both the elasticities and the MPCs in the last period than in the earlier periods. For the 
period 2007-2011, the implied MPC of the housing dividend on the narrower measure of total 
expenditures is almost 9 cents per dollar (9.5 cents for the broader measure of total expenditure). 
In contrast, the counterpart MPCs for home equity are 1.3 and 1.6 cents, respectively, 
dramatically lower than those of the housing dividend. For the period 1997-2006, the implied 
MPC of the housing dividend on total expenditure is 2 cents per dollar (2.9 cents for the broader 
measure) and is not statistically significant at a conventional level. However, the corresponding 
home equity MPCs (2.1 and 2.5 cents, respectively) are now comparable and statistically 
significant. These results accord well with the general hypothesis that as the liquidity of home 
equity declines, as was the case in 2007-2011, the gap between the impact of housing dividend 
and that of home equity expands. The housing dividend’s relevance is underscored.  
Some remarks on the housing market for these periods are in order. The results suggest 
that the willingness on the part of home buyers to purchase housing or take on debt to buy real 
estate above intrinsic value eliminates the ability to meaningfully hedge housing expenditures. 
During the boom period, buyers were willing to pay more for housing than the economic benefit 
that accrues to housing as measured by rental or occupancy costs. In addition, some existing 
homeowners refinanced existing debt for immediate cash, at the cost of diminishing or 
eliminating housing dividend altogether. This resulted in a large number of transactions in this 
period that truncated or failed to generate cash flow benefits. In other words, many market 
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participants fixed their ownership costs at such an elevated level that generation of a dividend 
benefit in the future is limited.31 As the market reverts back to one more in line with the long-
term trend, not only do these homeowners lose from the housing value correction, but they also 
fail to gain from lower housing costs that accompanied the market correction due to leverage 
taking. These households have little or no equity (as has been noted in the default literature), but 
also have higher housing costs (due to higher debt service needs, for example) relative to rental 
options. Only through default and foreclosure and/or debt restructuring, coupled with increases 
in rents, can the housing dividend increase for these households.32     
The evidence presented in Table 4 is further consistent with the popular belief that during 
the boom period a house was used more like an “ATM” as homeowners took on mortgage debt 
to fund consumption, especially for durables and service expenditures. For the 1997-2006 period, 
the elasticity of durables to mortgage balance is 0.15, and that of services to mortgage balance is 
0.08. This is in sharp contrast to 0.0037 (which is not statistically significant) and 0.0086 for 
these two elasticities in the period 2007-2011. The results are confirmatory of the general 
narrative for the boom period. 
Concerning our second hypothesis that homeowners with longer housing tenure enjoy a 
larger housing dividend benefit and thus additional consumption expenditures, Table 5 presents 
the results for our sample segmented by housing tenure. The first subgroup is comprised by 
households with housing tenure of less than 5 years, the second, between 5 and 15 years, and the 
third, between 15 and 25 years. The estimated elasticities of housing dividend in response to total 
                                                          
31 Existing literature highlights a mismatch in the house price-to-income ratio and price-to-rent ratio for the boom 
period. For example, see Beracha and Johnson (2012).   
32 While full investigations are beyond the scope of this paper, the results suggest that a differential between 
housing-service cost and rent could be a factor in mortgage default. A household might continue to service debt even 
with little or no equity if rental options for similar properties are priced such that the cost of the rental option 
(inclusive of moving costs) from a cash flow standpoint is equal or higher.  
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expenditure increase slightly from the first to the third subgroup, but they are still less than 0.02 
in magnitude. However, the implied MPCs for total expenditure increase notably along with the 
housing tenure. Beyond 15 years of tenure in the same house, the more narrowly defined total 
expenditure increases 6.6 cents (7.9 cents for the broader measure) in response to one dollar 
increase of housing dividend. In contrast, for those whose tenure was less than 15 years, these 
MPCs are 4.0 and 5.0 cents, respectively. These patterns affirm our proposed hypothesis that the 
impact of housing dividend will rise with housing tenure. 
 
9.  Conclusion 
 
The user cost concept widely adopted in the housing economics literature is reformulated 
into a discounted dividends model which serves as the basis for this research. The model links 
market rent, ownership costs and expected capital gains unequivocally within a discounted cash 
flow or dividends model. While the derivation of the model is of some interest, the primary focus 
is the introduction and application of the housing dividend construct to existing empirical models 
and presenting evidence showing that the housing dividend impacts household level non-housing 
expenditures. No studies, to our knowledge, have attempted to discern the effects of a housing 
ownership related implicit dividend on consumption expenditures. This gap in the literature is 
likely due to the literature’s historical focus on macro-level issues and a dearth of large-scale 
data sufficiently detailed to capture differences in both market equivalent rents and actual 
occupancy expenditures at the household level.  
The empirical results based upon CEX data show that this housing related dividend is 
important in determining household expenditures. This is in addition to other wealth effects 
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documented in the literature such as house value, home equity, mortgage debt and financial 
assets. The vital role of the housing dividend on expenditures, even after controlling for housing 
wealth, implies that pure application of the dividend irrelevance tenet to consumption is unlikely 
in practice, probably due to the distinctive illiquidity of the housing market, as our model 
conjectures and our empirical results verify.   
Overall, this research strongly suggests that the benefit to home ownership as related to 
consumption comes not only from the accumulation of housing equity and potential cash-outs 
from mortgage loans. An additional benefit to home ownership, related to hedging or fixing 
housing costs, is provided. A supplementary extension is related to the buy versus rent literature 
where the assumption is that households have the ability and willingness to segment housing 
related cash flows based solely as investment related flows.  The present research challenges the 
assumption that households will save/invest all cash flow generated from regime switching 
between house renting and buying. Households likely spend part of any benefit and perhaps also 
lose out on the forced savings related to ownership. 
At the policy level, the results suggest that a better understanding of household level 
economic decision-making is needed. Also, a deeper understanding of how household wealth 
accumulation and expenditures change when housing prices departure from their historic value 
relative to rent is required. Households vary in their individual circumstances and these impact 
their economic decisions. In the long run, households should have the correct incentives and 
education or knowledge to make sound choices. These choices may also be related to the local 
markets within which they reside. We also need to recognize that ownership can reduce 
uncertainty in required household level expenditures which will impact consumption choices.   
Policies that reduce uncertainty in housing costs and concurrent household level volatility in cash 
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flow allocated to housing are likely to be beneficial and need assessment. Policies that reduce 
uncertainty in costs may be as useful as policies that address price uncertainty and volatility. 
Additional research is needed to shed more light on these topics. 
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Figure 1 Life-cycle patterns of the housing dividend for homeowners 
 
Notes: The graph demonstrates the means of annual housing dividends for each age group. Values in various years are adjusted 
by CPI-U to 2005 dollars. "All years" series are calculated based on all CEX household observations for the entire period. "1988-
1996", "1997-2006" and "2007-2011" are based on household observations from 1988 to 1996, from 1997 to 2006, and from 
2007 to 2011, respectively. 
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Figure 2 Decomposition of the housing dividend for homeowners 
 
Notes: The graph demonstrates the means of housing dividend components for each age group from 1996 to 2011 for which the 
data for decomposition variables are available in CEX. Values of various years are adjusted by CPI-U to 2005 dollars. Mortgage 
payments include payments to reduce mortgage principal, mortgage interests, and property taxes. Maintenance costs include costs 
of house maintenance and repairs, insurance costs, and other expenses. 
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Figure 3 Housing dividend by tenure  
 
 
Notes: The graph demonstrates the median of housing dividends by tenure of home ownership based on CEX household 
observations from 1996 to 2011. Values in various years are adjusted by CPI-U to 2005 dollars.  
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Table 1  Summary statistics for CEX sample data 
             
  All Years   Year 1988-1996   Year 1997-2006   Year 2007-2011  
 Median Mean Std. 
Dev 
Median Mean Std. 
Dev 
Median Mean Std. 
Dev 
Median Mean Std. 
Dev 
             
Housing dividend 3,309 3,170 8,892 3,322 3,227 6,844 3,421 3,331 9,362 3,062 2,829 9,748 
Home  value 161,324 216,959 206,873 131,109 161,358 110,183 160,085 216,404 209,044 177,907 242,133 230,921 
Home equity 73,322 124,947 182,188 55,529 78,740 89,909 60,039 108,130 171,744 104,481 164,240 213,612 
Mort. bal. 69,739 92,012 96,456 66,128 82,618 68,548 87,455 108,274 92,915 40,544 77,892 107,499 
Stockholdings 2,511 56,663 234,609 4,498 33,375 85,322 2,311 66,068 269,244 1,492 62,608 293,171 
After-tax income 52,829 65,285 54,411 48,855 56,948 41,968 53,477 66,219 56,286 56,440 71,740 60,406 
             
Age 52 53.6 15.9 50 52.6 16.2 52 53.7 15.9 54 54.4 15.7 
Family size 2 2.7 1.4 2 2.8 1.5 2 2.7 1.4 2 2.6 1.5 
Marital status 1 67.0% 47.0% 1 69.5% 46.1% 1 66.9% 47.1% 1 64.7% 47.8% 
Urban residence 1 89.5% 30.6% 1 86.3% 34.3% 1 89.0% 31.2% 1 93.6% 24.6% 
Race - white 1 88.6% 31.8% 1 90.5% 29.3% 1 88.2% 32.3% 1 87.5% 33.1% 
             
             
Notes: All observations from all years are included in calculating these summary statistics. Wealth variables include both positive and 
negative values. All values are in 2005 dollars. 
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Table 2  Housing dividend and household expenditures of homeowners (for the age group 26-55) 
        
 Food Nondurables Durables Services Total  Services Total   
      (broader definition) 
        
Log housing dividend 0.0241*** 0.0107*** -0.0354** 0.0124*** 0.0115*** 0.0143*** 0.0127*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
        
Log home value 0.0806*** 0.0501*** 0.1063*** 0.1332*** 0.0962*** 0.1461*** 0.1049*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.023) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) 
        
Log financial wealth 0.0070*** 0.0056*** 0.0851*** 0.0213*** 0.0178*** 0.0246*** 0.0198*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
        
Log after-tax income 0.1912*** 0.1504*** 0.5328*** 0.2619*** 0.2484*** 0.2884*** 0.2639*** 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.037) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017) (0.015) 
        
Implied MPC        
  Housing dividend 0.0206 0.0131 -0.0075 0.0221 0.0428 0.0280 0.0505 
  Home value 0.0036 0.0031 0.0022 0.0131 0.0196 0.0164 0.0229 
  Financial wealth 0.0078 0.0089 0.0494 0.0525 0.0947 0.0691 0.1119 
  Income 0.0209 0.0231 0.0276 0.0610 0.1226 0.0757 0.1392 
        
Other variables        
        
  Age 0.0352*** 0.0234*** 0.0064 0.0166*** 0.0120** 0.0111** 0.0097* 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.022) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
  Age Squared -0.0004*** -0.0002*** -0.0002 -0.0001** -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Family size 0.1155*** 0.1239*** 0.1061*** 0.0393*** 0.0691*** 0.0504*** 0.0737*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
  Marital status 0.1047*** 0.1482*** 0.2562*** 0.0843*** 0.1266*** 0.0955*** 0.1308*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.044) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) 
  Urban residence 0.0476*** -0.0230* -02315*** 0.0827*** -0.0156 0.0925*** -0.0070 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.063) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) 
  Race-caucasian 0.1158*** 0.1099*** 0.4122*** 0.0502*** 0.1013*** 0.0309*** 0.0877*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.053) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
        
  Year 1993-1996 -0.0907*** -0.1051*** -0.0244 0.0301*** -0.0163 0.0337*** -0.0128 
  Year 1997-2000 -0.1145*** -0.1498*** -0.1039* 0.0133** -0.0397** 0.0144 -0.0377** 
  Year 2001-2004 -0.1768*** -0.2143*** -0.3320*** -0.0384** -0.0953*** -0.0196 -0.0829*** 
  Year 2005-2007 -0.1553*** -0.1460*** -0.6110*** -0.0425** -0.1212*** -0.0173 -0.1033*** 
  Year 2007-2011 -0.1021*** -0.1816*** -0.8649*** 0.0273* -0.1551*** -0.0133 -0.1408*** 
        
(Constant) 4.2987*** 5.8112*** 0.2983 4.1541*** 5.6599*** 3.8592*** 5.4489*** 
        
Observations 13,603 13,602 13,601 13,601 13,602 13,601 13,602 
        
Adjusted R-squared 0.421 0.449 0.184 0.424 0.406 0.445 0.431 
        
Notes:  
(a) This is the pooled sample 1988-2011, for households whose head aged 26-55. The sample does not include observations 
from 1995:Q3-Q4 and 2004:Q3-Q4, due to sampling frame change starting in 1996 and 2005, which leads to a portion of 
families not able to be tracked across a full year. Neither does the sample include observations from 1991:Q2-Q4 and 1992, 
due to missing detailed expenditure files on mortgage payments and house ownership costs. 
(b) MPC indicates the calculated Marginal Propensity to Consume. Transforming coefficients into MPCs involves multiplying 
them with a benchmark (in our case, the median) of the corresponding expenditure-wealth (income) ratios. 
(c) Dependent variables are the logs of expenditure of each type (food, nondurables, durables, services, and total). The broader 
definition of services and total expenditures includes education and charity expenses. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
(d) Food expenditure includes spending on food consumed at home, at work, and at places outside home. Nondurable goods 
have an average useful life of less than 3 years, including food and beverages purchased for off-premises consumption, 
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clothing and footwear, gasoline and other energy goods, and other nondurable goods. Durable goods have an average useful 
life of at least 3 years, including motor vehicles and parts, furnishings and durable household equipment, recreational goods 
and vehicles, and other durable goods. Services include house utilities, health care, transportation services, recreation 
services, food services and accommodations, financial services and insurance, and other services. The total expenditure is 
the sum of the above three primary types. 
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Table 3  Housing dividend and household expenditures of homeowners:  
decomposition of home value (for the age group 26-55) 
        
 Food Nondurables Durables Services Total Services Total  
                    (broader definition) 
        
Log housing dividend 0.0240*** 0.0095*** -0.0263** 0.0153*** 0.0133*** 0.0172*** 0.0146*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
        
Log home equity 0.0441*** 0.0310*** 0.0188 0.0642*** 0.0452*** 0.0709*** 0.0497*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.014) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
        
Log mortgage bal. 0.0069*** 0.0039*** 0.0176*** 0.0135*** 0.0086*** 0.0144*** 0.0093*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
        
Log financial wealth 0.0074*** 0.0058*** 0.0850*** 0.0220*** 0.0184*** 0.0254*** 0.0203*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
        
Log after-tax income 0.1999*** 0.1535*** 0.5447*** 0.2780*** 0.2604*** 0.3056*** 0.2768*** 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.037) (0.016) (0.015) (0.018) (0.016) 
        
Implied MPC        
  Housing dividend 0.0205 0.0116 -0.0056 0.0273 0.0496 0.0338 0.0581 
  Home equity 0.0044 0.0043 0.0009 0.0139 0.0203 0.0174 0.0240 
  Mortgage bal. 0.0005 0.0004 0.0007 0.0023 0.0031 0.0028 0.0036 
  Financial wealth 0.0083 0.0093 0.0494 0.0542 0.0975 0.0713 0.1152 
  Income 0.0218 0.0236 0.0282 0.0648 0.1286 0.0802 0.1460 
        
Other variables        
        
  Age 0.0341*** 0.0219*** 0.0098 0.0140*** 0.0100* 0.0084 0.0076 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.023) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
  Age Squared -0.0004*** -0.0002*** -0.0002 -0.0001* -0.0001 -0.000 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Family size 0.1155*** 0.1242*** 0.1062*** 0.0394*** 0.0694*** 0.0510*** 0.0743*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
  Marital status 0.1047*** 0.1487*** 0.2720*** 0.0849*** 0.1264*** 0.0966*** 0.1309*** 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.045) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) 
  Urban residence 0.0476*** -0.0124 -0.2035*** 0.1100*** 0.0060 0.1238*** 0.0172*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.064) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
  Race-caucasian 0.1195*** 0.1128*** 0.4345*** 0.0557*** 0.1079*** 0.0348*** 0.0933*** 
 (0.011) (0.009) (0.054) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
        
  Year 1993-1996 -0.0807*** -0.0987*** -0.0384 0.0408** -0.0100 0.0465*** -0.0054 
  Year 1997-2000 -0.0965*** -0.1359*** -0.1073* 0.0360** -0.0234 0.0399** -0.0198 
  Year 2001-2004 -0.1562*** -0.2018*** -0.3254*** -0.0069 -0.0758*** 0.0168 -0.0603*** 
  Year 2005-2007 -0.1376*** -0.1361*** -0.6001*** -0.0113 -0.1009*** 0.0176 -0.0808*** 
  Year 2007-2011 -0.0724*** -0.1658*** -0.8050*** 0.0255 -0.1216*** 0.0446** -0.1036*** 
        
(Constant) 4.6037*** 6.0212*** 0.8064 4.7036*** 6.0785*** 4.4631*** 5.9025*** 
        
Observations 12,996 12,995 12,994 12,994 12,995 12,994 12,995 
        
Adjusted R-squared 0.416 0.449 0.183 0.409 0.396 0.430 0.420 
        
Notes:  
(a) This is the pooled sample 1988-2011, for households whose head aged 26-55. The sample does not include observations 
from 1995:Q3-Q4 and 2004:Q3-Q4, due to sampling frame change starting in 1996 and 2005, which leads to a portion of 
families not able to be tracked across a full year. Neither does the sample include observations from 1991:Q2-Q4 and 1992, 
due to missing detailed expenditure files on mortgage payments and house ownership costs. 
(b) MPC indicates the calculated Marginal Propensity to Consume. Transforming coefficients into MPCs involves multiplying 
them with a benchmark (in our case, the median) of the corresponding expenditure-wealth(income) ratios. 
(c) Dependent variables are the logs of expenditure of each type (food, nondurables, durables, services, and total). The broader 
definition of services and total expenditures includes education and charity expenses. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
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(d) Food expenditure includes spending on food consumed at home, at work, and at places outside home. Nondurable goods 
have an average useful life of less than 3 years, including food and beverages purchased for off-premises consumption, 
clothing and footwear, gasoline and other energy goods, and other nondurable goods. Durable goods have an average useful 
life of at least 3 years, including motor vehicles and parts, furnishings and durable household equipment, recreational goods 
and vehicles, and other durable goods. Services include house utilities, health care, transportation services, recreation 
services, food services and accommodations, financial services and insurance, and other services. The total expenditure is 
the sum of the above three primary types. 
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Table 4  Housing dividend and household expenditures of homeowners:  
real estate cycle sub-periods: 1988-1996, 1997-2006, vs. 2007-2011 (for the age group 26-55) 
        
 Food Nondurables Durables Services Total Services Total  
      (broader definition) 
   1988-1996 Sub-period     
        
Log housing dividend 0.0196*** 0.0008 0.0018 0.0149** 0.0110 0.0173*** 0.0127*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.023) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
        
Log home equity 0.0440*** 0.0388*** 0.0502** 0.0731*** 0.0592*** 0.0798*** 0.0631*** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.024) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
        
Log mortgage bal. 0.0352*** 0.0205*** 0.0994*** 0.0604*** 0.0473*** 0.0630*** 0.0498*** 
 (0.008) (0.001) (0.031) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
        
Log financial wealth 0.0116*** 0.0077*** 0.0431*** 0.0236*** 0.0163*** 0.0270*** 0.0182*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
        
Log after-tax income 0.1688*** 0.1571*** 0.4336*** 0.2469*** 0.2395*** 0.2658*** 0.2487*** 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.092) (0.036) (0.041) (0.037) (0.042) 
        
Implied MPC        
  Housing dividend 0.0213 0.0013 0.0008 0.0316 0.0525 0.0404 0.0637 
  Home equity 0.0057 0.0071 0.0041 0.0197 0.0353 0.0243 0.0402 
  Mortgage bal. 0.0035 0.0030 0.0067 0.0130 0.0223 0.0151 0.0249 
  Financial wealth 0.0131 0.0126 0.0304 0.0544 0.0858 0.0701 0.1020 
  Income 0.0208 0.0281 0.0313 0.0612 0.1327 0.0732 0.1453 
        
Observations 2,647 2,647 2,647 2,645 2,647 2,645 2,647 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.419 0.449 0.133 0.395 0.370 0.418 0.395 
        
   1997-2006 Sub-period     
        
Log housing dividend 0.0160*** 0.0038 -0.0455** 0.0102** 0.0053 0.0130*** 0.0072 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.019) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
        
Log home equity 0.0429*** 0.0317*** 0.0216 0.0571*** 0.0400*** 0.0635*** 0.0444*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.020) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
        
Log mortgage bal. 0.0488*** 0.0375*** 0.1546*** 0.0841*** 0.0707*** 0.0949*** 0.0775*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.027) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) 
        
Log financial wealth 0.0067*** 0.0057*** 0.0833*** 0.0206*** 0.0181*** 0.0241*** 0.0200*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
        
Log after-tax income 0.1748*** 0.1470*** 0.4709*** 0.2493*** 0.2466*** 0.2739*** 0.2605*** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.048) (0.021) (0.020) (0.024) (0.022) 
        
Implied MPC        
  Housing dividend 0.0130 0.0045 -0.0101 0.0181 0.0193 0.0253 0.0285 
  Home equity 0.0047 0.0049 0.0013 0.0143 0.0212 0.0180 0.0250 
  Mortgage bal. 0.0036 0.0039 0.0066 0.0141 0.0254 0.0182 0.0298 
  Financial wealth 0.0068 0.0081 0.0481 0.0480 0.0909 0.0635 0.1065 
  Income 0.0179 0.0215 0.0252 0.0568 0.1200 0.0708 0.1359 
        
Observations 6,378 6,378 6,377 6,378 6,378 6,378 6,378 
Adjusted R-squared 0.424 0.462 0.155 0.404 0.388 0.427 0.415 
        
   2007-2011 Sub-period     
        
Log housing dividend 0.0436*** 0.0276*** -0.0102 0.0280*** 0.0314*** 0.0281*** 0.0314*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.027) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
        
Log home equity 0.0437*** 0.0250*** -0.0013 0.0723*** 0.0470*** 0.0799*** 0.0527*** 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.031) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) 
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Log mortgage bal. 0.0038*** 0.0022*** 0.0037 0.0086*** 0.0048*** 0.0086*** 0.0050*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.007) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
        
Log financial wealth 0.0053*** 0.0037*** 0.0980*** 0.0201*** 0.0166*** 0.0231*** 0.0184*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
        
Log after-tax income 0.2267*** 0.1487*** 0.6433*** 0.2961*** 0.2624*** 0.3279*** 0.2825*** 
 (0.025) (0.015) (0.067) (0.030) (0.025) (0.032) (0.027) 
        
Implied MPC        
  Housing dividend 0.0306 0.0255 -0.0007 0.0398 0.0875 0.0435 0.0945 
  Home equity 0.0030 0.0023 0.0000 0.0106 0.0134 0.0134 0.0163 
  Mortgage bal. 0.0003 0.0002 0.0001 0.0013 0.0014 0.0015 0.0016 
  Financial wealth 0.0071 0.0068 0.0432 0.0603 0.0983 0.0790 0.1184 
  Income 0.0238 0.0207 0.0197 0.0668 0.1141 0.0839 0.1331 
        
Observations 3.971 3,970 3,970 3.971 3,970 3,971 3,970 
Adjusted R-squared 0.427 0.439 0.165 0.458 0.436 0.476 0.461 
        
Notes:  
 
(a) This is the pooled sample 1988-1996, 1997-2006, and 2007-2011, respectively, for households whose head aged 26-55. The 
sample does not include observations from 1995:Q3-Q4 and 2004:Q3-Q4, due to sampling frame change starting in 1996 
and 2005, which leads to a portion of families not able to be tracked across a full year. Neither does the sample include 
observations from 1991:Q2-Q4 and 1992, due to missing detailed expenditure files on mortgage payments and house 
ownership costs. 
(b) MPC indicates the calculated Marginal Propensity to Consume. Transforming coefficients into MPCs involves multiplying 
them with a benchmark (in our case, the median) of the corresponding expenditure-wealth(income) ratios. 
(c) Dependent variables are the logs of expenditure of each type (food, nondurables, durables, services, and total). The broader 
definition of services and total expenditures includes education and charity expenses. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
(d) Food expenditure includes spending on food consumed at home, at work, and at places outside home. Nondurable goods 
have an average useful life of less than 3 years, including food and beverages purchased for off-premises consumption, 
clothing and footwear, gasoline and other energy goods, and other nondurable goods. Durable goods have an average useful 
life of at least 3 years, including motor vehicles and parts, furnishings and durable household equipment, recreational goods 
and vehicles, and other durable goods. Services include house utilities, health care, transportation services, recreation 
services, food services and accommodations, financial services and insurance, and other services. The total expenditure is 
the sum of the above three primary types. 
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Table 5  Housing dividend and household expenditures of homeowners: 
separate results by housing tenure (for the age group 26-55) 
        
 Food Nondurables Durables Services Total Services Total  
      (broader definition) 
   Tenure <= 5 years     
        
Log housing dividend 0.0234*** 0.0126*** -0.0425** 0.0164** 0.0121** 0.0159*** 0.0121*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.020) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
        
Log of home value 0.0713*** 0.0493*** 0.0744** 0.1352*** 0.0931*** 0.1485*** 0.1014*** 
 (0.009) (0.007) (0.024) (0.012) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) 
        
Log financial wealth 0.0088*** 0.0063*** 0.0889*** 0.0237*** 0.0202*** 0.0279***  0.0226*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
        
Log after-tax income 0.1586*** 0.1306*** 0.4795*** 0.2243*** 0.2227*** 0.2388*** 0.2305*** 
 (0.016) (0.014) (0.049) (0.023) (0.021) (0.025) (0.022) 
        
Implied MPC        
  Housing dividend 0.0200 0.0154 -0.0091 0.0291 0.0451 0.0311 0.0481 
  Home value 0.0032 0.0031 0.0016 0.0133 0.0189 0.0166 0.0222 
  Financial wealth 0.0098 0.0100 0.0516 0.0584 0.1074 0.0784 0.1282 
  Income 0.0173 0.0201 0.0248 0.0523 0.10998 0.0627 0.1216 
        
Observations 6,032 6,032 6,032 6,030 6,032 6,030 6,032 
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.393 0.435 0.174 0.391 0.373 0.411 0.397 
        
   Tenure > 5 years to Tenure <= 15 years     
        
Log housing dividend 0.0250*** 0.0099** -0.0237  0.0110** 0.0106*** 0.0140*** 0.0128*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.019) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
        
Log of home value 0.0836*** 0.0479*** 0.1280*** 0.1312*** 0.0959*** 0.01434*** 0.1045*** 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.039) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) (0.012) 
        
Log financial wealth 0.0054***   0.0044***   0.0752***   0.0193***    0.0149*** 0.0222***   0.0167*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
        
Log after-tax income 0.2028***   0.1611***   0.5264***  0.2792***    0.2550*** 0.3158***   0.2767*** 
 (0.016) (0.013) (0.064) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) 
        
Implied MPC        
  Housing dividend 0.0214 0.0121 -0.0050 0.0196 0.0397 0.0274 0.0506 
  Home value 0.0037 0.0030 0.0027 0.0129 0.0195 0.0161 0.0229 
  Financial wealth 0.0060 0.0070 0.0437 0.0476 0.0791 0.0623 0.0944 
  Income 0.0221 0.0247 0.0272 0.0651 0.1259 0.0829 0.1460 
        
Observations 5,354 5,353 5,352 5,354 5,353 5,354 5,353 
Adjusted R-squared 0.438 0.446 0.176 0.436 0.411 0.461 0.438 
        
   Tenure > 15 years and Tenure <= 25 years     
        
Log housing dividend 0.0221*** 0.0099 -0.0218 0.0022 0.0177** 0.0081 0.0198** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.037) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
        
Log home equity 0.1098***   0.0608*** 0.1423*   0.1373***  0.1060***  0.1538***  0.1181*** 
 (0.020) (0.014) (0.073) (0.019) (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) 
        
Log financial wealth 0.0053*** 0.0070*** 0.0921*** 0.0209*** 0.0191*** 0.0227*** 0.0200*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.011) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
        
Log after-tax income 0.2601***  0.1801*** 0.6550*** 0.3361*** 0.3005*** 0.3749*** 0.3252*** 
 (0.048) (0.022) (0.088) (0.031) (0.027) (0.033) (0.028) 
        
Implied MPC        
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  Housing dividend 0.0190 0.0120 -0.0046 0.0039 0.0661 0.0158 0.0787 
  Home equity 0.0049 0.0038 0.0030 0.0135 0.0216 0.0172 0.0258 
  Financial wealth 0.0088 0.0111 0.0535 0.0515 0.1012 0.0636 0.1130 
  Income 0.0284 0.0277 0.0339 0.0783 0.1483 0.0984 0.1716 
        
Observations   1,824 1,824 1,824 1,824 1,824 1,824 1,824 
Adjusted R-squared 0.433 0.473 0.222 0.470 0.472 0.488 0.495 
        
 
Notes:  
 
(a) This is the pooled sample for households whose head aged 26-55 segmented by their housing tenure. The sample does not 
include observations from 1995:Q3-Q4 and 2004:Q3-Q4, due to sampling frame change starting in 1996 and 2005, which 
leads to a portion of families not able to be tracked across a full year. Neither does the sample include observations from 
1991:Q2-Q4 and 1992, due to missing detailed expenditure files on mortgage payments and house ownership costs. 
(b) MPC indicates the calculated Marginal Propensity to Consume. Transforming coefficients into MPCs involves multiplying 
them with a benchmark (in our case, the median) of the corresponding expenditure-wealth(income) ratios. 
(c) Dependent variables are the logs of expenditure of each type (food, nondurables, durables, services, and total). The broader 
definition of services and total expenditures includes education and charity expenses. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. 
(d) Food expenditure includes spending on food consumed at home, at work, and at places outside home. Nondurable goods 
have an average useful life of less than 3 years, including food and beverages purchased for off-premises consumption, 
clothing and footwear, gasoline and other energy goods, and other nondurable goods. Durable goods have an average useful 
life of at least 3 years, including motor vehicles and parts, furnishings and durable household equipment, recreational goods 
and vehicles, and other durable goods. Services include house utilities, health care, transportation services, recreation 
services, food services and accommodations, financial services and insurance, and other services. The total expenditure is 
the sum of the above three primary types. 
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Table A1  Housing wealth, financial wealth and household expenditures 
(for the age group 26-55) 
           
 Food Implied Nondurables Implied Durables Implied Services Implied Total Implied 
  MPC  MPC  MPC  MPC  MPC 
           
           
Log home value 0.0960*** 0.0039 0.0587*** 0.0033 0.1083*** 0.0020 0.1430*** 0.0127 0.1079*** 0.0198 
 (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.018)  (0.006)  (0.006)  
           
Log financial wealth 0.0065*** 0.0072 0.0057*** 0.0091 0.0840*** 0.0488 0.0210*** 0.0517 0.0180*** 0.0955 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.001)  
           
Log after-tax income 0.1933*** 0.0211 0.1502*** 0.0231 0.5080*** 0.0263 0.2710*** 0.0631 0.2488*** 0.1228 
 (0.009)  (0.007)  (0.029)  (0.012)  (0.012)  
           
Age 0.0360***  0.0260***  -0.0024  0.0212***  0.0110***  
 (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.017)  (0.004)  (0.004)  
             
Age (squared) -0.0004***  -0.0002***  -0.0001  -0.0002***  -0.0001  
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  
           
Family size 0.1103***  0.1194***  0.0998***  0.0374***  0.0663***  
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
           
Marital status 0.1101***  0.1538***  0.2736***  0.0874***  0.1310***  
 (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.034)  (0.008)  (0.008)  
            
Urban Residence 0.0534***  -0.0075  -0.1519***  0.0794***  0.0018  
 (0.010)  (0.0009)  (0.046)  (0.010)  (0.011)  
           
Race-caucasian 0.1160***  0.1137***  0.4609***  0.0655***  0.1138***  
 (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.041)  (0.009)  (0.009)  
           
  Year 1993-1996 -0.0829***  -0.0967***  -0.0127  0.0547***   0.0001  
  Year 1997-2000 -0.1048***  -0.1403***  -0.0720*  0.0409***  -0.0163  
  Year 2001-2004 -0.1517***  -0.1917***  -0.2559***  0.0145  -0.0500***  
  Year 2005-2007 -0.1212***  -0.1260***  -0.5524***  0.0147  -0.0777***  
  Year 2007-2011 -0.0667***  -0.1591***  -0.8046***  0.0430***  -0.1069***  
           
(Constant) 4.2109***  5.6980***  0.2359  3.8681***  5.5361***  
           
Observations 22,954  22,953  22,952  22,952  22,953  
           
Adjusted R-squared 0.413  0.440  0.178  0.428  0.402  
           
 
Notes:  
(a) This is the pooled sample 1988-2011, for households whose head aged 26-55. The sample does not include observations 
from 1995:Q3-Q4 and 2004:Q3-Q4, due to sampling frame change starting in 1996 and 2005, which leads to a portion of 
families not able to be tracked across a full year. Neither does the sample include observations from 1991:Q2-Q4 and 1992, 
due to missing detailed expenditure files on mortgage payments and house maintenance costs. 
(b) MPC indicates the calculated Marginal Propensity to Consume. Transforming coefficients into MPCs involves multiplying 
them with a benchmark (in our case, the median) of the corresponding expenditure-wealth(income) ratios. 
(c) Dependent variables are the logs of expenditure of each type (food, nondurables, durables, services, and total). *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.  
(d) Food expenditure includes spending on food consumed at home, at work, and at places outside home. Nondurable goods 
have an average useful life of less than 3 years, including food and beverages purchased for off-premises consumption, 
clothing and footwear, gasoline and other energy goods, and other nondurable goods. Durable goods have an average useful 
life of at least 3 years, including motor vehicles and parts, furnishings and durable household equipment, recreational goods 
and vehicles, and other durable goods. Services include house utilities, health care, transportation services, recreation 
services, food services and accommodations, financial services and insurance, and other services. The total expenditure is 
the sum of the above three primary types. 
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Table A2  Median regressions of housing dividend and household expenditures of homeowners 
(for the age group 26-55) 
        
 Food Nondurables Durables Services Total  Services Total   
      (broader definition) 
        
Log housing dividend 0.0232*** 0.0091*** -0.0082 0.0127*** 0.0118*** 0.0146*** 0.0157*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
        
Log home equity 0.0353*** 0.0246*** 0.0272** 0.0519*** 0.0373*** 0.0548*** 0.0403*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
        
Log mortgage bal. 0.0045*** 0.0021* 0.0101* 0.0084*** 0.0037*** 0.0085*** 0.0050*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
        
Log financial wealth 0.0069*** 0.0048*** 0.0510***  0.0186*** 0.0166*** 0.0224*** 0.0182*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
        
Log after-tax income 0.2364*** 0.1869*** 0.5927*** 0.3685*** 0.3333*** 0.4079*** 0.3585*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.022) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
        
Implied MPC        
  Housing dividend 0.0199 0.0111 -0.0017 0.0227 0.0440 0.0286 0.0624 
  Home equity 0.0035 0.0034 0.0013 0.0112 0.0168 0.0134 0.0195 
  Mortgage balance 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 0.0014 0.0014 0.0017 0.0019 
  Financial wealth 0.0076 0.0076 0.0296 0.0458 0.0883 0.0629 0.1030 
  Income 0.0258 0.0287 0.0307 0.0859 0.1645 0.1071 0.1891 
        
Observations 12,996 12,995 12,994 12,994 12,995 12,994 12,995 
        
Pseudo R-squared 0.246 0.266 0.099 0.251 0.244 0.268 0.261 
        
Notes:  
(a) This is the pooled sample 1988-2011, for households whose head aged 26-55. The sample does not include observations 
from 1995:Q3-Q4 and 2004:Q3-Q4, due to sampling frame change starting in 1996 and 2005, which leads to a portion of 
families not able to be tracked across a full year. Neither does the sample include observations from 1991:Q2-Q4 and 1992, 
due to missing detailed expenditure files on mortgage payments and house maintenance costs. 
(b) MPC indicates the calculated Marginal Propensity to Consume. Transforming coefficients into MPCs involves multiplying 
them with a benchmark (in our case, the median) of the corresponding expenditure-wealth (income) ratios. 
(c) Dependent variables are the log of expenditure of each type (food, nondurables, durables, services, and total). The broader 
definition of services and total expenditures includes education and charity expenses. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
(d) Food expenditure includes spending on food consumed at home, at work, and at places outside home. Nondurable goods 
have an average useful life of less than 3 years, including food and beverages purchased for off-premises consumption, 
clothing and footwear, gasoline and other energy goods, and other nondurable goods. Durable goods have an average useful 
life of at least 3 years, including motor vehicles and parts, furnishings and durable household equipment, recreational goods 
and vehicles, and other durable goods. Services include house utilities, health care, transportation services, recreation 
services, food services and accommodations, financial services and insurance, and other services. The total expenditure is 
the sum of the above three primary types. 
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